University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 19
Number 2 Winter, 1989

Article 8

1989

Recent Developments: Mendelson v. Mendelson:
Enforcement of Spousal Support Agreement
Incorporated but Not Merged into Divorce Decree
Limited to Terms of Contract
Jules R. Bricker

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Bricker, Jules R. (1989) "Recent Developments: Mendelson v. Mendelson: Enforcement of Spousal Support Agreement Incorporated
but Not Merged into Divorce Decree Limited to Terms of Contract," University of Baltimore Law Forum: Vol. 19 : No. 2 , Article 8.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol19/iss2/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

Recent Developments
Mendelson v. Mendelson:
ENFORCEMENT OF SPOUSAL
SUPPORT AGREEMENT
INCORPORATED BUT NOT
MERGED INTO DIVORCE
DECREE liMITED TO TERMS OF
CONTRACT
In Mendelson v. Mendelson, 75 Md. App.
486, 541 A.2d 1331 (1988), the Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland considered
the power of a court to modify a separation agreement after the enrollment of a
divorce decree. The court held that the
parties were limited to an action at contract since the separation agreement contained a non-merger clause. Thus, the
parties' rights to seek modification or termination of contractual spousal support
were limited to the conditions of the agreement.
Erwin Mendelson (appellant), and
Helene Mendelson (appellee) entered into
a separation and property settlement agreement in July 1976. The parties agreed to
the payment of spousal support, a cost of
living adjustment and the termination of
support upon death or appellee's remarriage. Further, appellee waived the right to
seek additional alimony provided that
appellant upheld the terms of the agreement.
The final section of the agreement provided the terms under which appellant
could seek a reduction in spousal support.
The parties agreed that if appellant either
became disabled, or retired at age 60 or
thereafter, "the parties shall attempt to
agree on alimony ... payments that are
equitable in light of changed financial
resources." The Mendelson's stipulated
that either could seek relief of court if they
were unable to reach an agreement upon
the occurrence of the above conditions. Id.
at 491-92,541 A.2d at 1334. The separation
agreement was incorporated but not
merged into the decree of divorce of the
Circuit Court of Montgomery County in
March 1977.
Several years after the divorce, appellee

developed a close personal relationship
with Manuel Epstein, who later moved
into appellee's home. Epstein shared
responsibility for the payment of various
household expenses. Id.
In November 1985 appellant petitioned
the court to terminate or reduce spousal
support based on his former wife's
changed financial circumstances and
"flagrant misconduct" with respect to the
terms and conditions of the separation
agreement. The domestic relations master
determined that appellee's relationship did
not significantly alter her financial condition and did not constitute "flagrant misconduct." The circuit court overruled
appellant's exceptions and affirmed the
master's report. Appellant then sought
leave of the decision of the lower court
through an appeal to the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland. Id.
Judge Bloom, delivering the opinion of
the court, avoided ruling on the merits of
the arguments upon which the appeal was
based. Id. at 493, 541 A.2d 1335. See Atkin·
son 'V. Atkinson, 13 Md. App. 65, 281 A.2d
407 (1971); Roberts v. Roberts, 35 Md. App.
497, 371 A.2d 689 (1977); Meyer 'V. ltfeyer,
41 Md. App. 13,394 A.2d 1220 (1978); cert.
denied. 284 Md. 746 (1979). Instead, the
court concluded:
We need not resolve this dispute. We
do not reach it because there is a more
fundamental basis for affirming the
denial of appellant's petition to terminate or modify support. By providing that their agreement should be
incorporated but not merged in the
divorce decree, the parties deprived the
court of any post-enrollment power to
end or diminish the contractual support for any reason not specified in the
agreement.

Mendelson at 495, 541 A.2d at 1335.
The court began its discussion of the
applicable law with a review of the distinctions among alimony, technical alimony
and contractual spousal support. The trad-

tional definition of alimony was "court
ordered payments to a wife for her support to continue during the joint lives of
both husband and wife and so long as the
parties live separate and apart." Id. {citing
Bebermeyer '0. Bebermeyer, 241 Md. 72, 215
A.2d 463 (1965». This definition was later
modified to eliminate gender bias and
allow awards of alimony for a limited or
indefinite duration. Mendelson at 496, 541
A.2d at 1336 (citing Md. Fam. Law Code
Ann. §§11-106(a), 11-106(c) (1984, 1987
Cum. Supp.». If the agreed spousal support could have been awarded absent the
agreement, the agreement was considered
technical alimony once it was made part of
the decree. Bebermeyer at 77, 215 A.2d at
468. Whereas the court was empowered to
award alimony, spousal support could be
granted only upon agreement of the parties. Mendelson at 496, 541 A.2d at 1336
{citing Bello/atto 'V. Bello/atto, 245 Md. 379,
226 A.2d 313 (1967». Support provisions
which failed to meet the definition of technical alimony remained contractual even
though they were made part of the decree.
lIfendelson at 496, 541 A.2d at 1336.
Erosion of these distinctions became
clear after 1950. Prior to 1950 a spousal
support agreement which did not qualify
as technical alimony could be enforced by
sequestration, execution and attachment.
Contractual spousal support could not,
however, be enforced by imprisonment
for contempt. Further, contractual spousal
support could not be modified by the
court. Id. at 497, 541 A.2d 1336 (citing
Soldano '0. Soldano. 258 Md. 145,265 A.2d
263 (1970); Reichhart 'V. Brent, 247 Md. 66,
230 A.2d 326 (1967); Dickey '0. Dickey, 154
Md. 675, 141 A. 387 (1928».
These established principles of domestic
law were changed significantly by amendments to the Maryland Constitution and
the Maryland Family Law Article. Md.
Fam. Law Code Ann. § 8-103(b) (1984,
1987 Cum. Supp.». In 1950, the Maryland
Constitution was amended to allow
imprisonment for a violation of a divorce
decree:
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No person shall be imprisoned for
debt, but a valid decree of a court of
competent jurisdiction or agreement
approved by decree of said court for the
support of a spouse .. . shall not consti·
tute a debt within the meaning of this
section.
Md. Const. art III, § 38 (emphasis added).
The aforementioned section of the code
also states that contractual spousal support
is subject to modification unless the parties
provide otherwise. Mendelson at 497, 541
A.2d at 1336.
With recognition of the plain language
of the statutes, the court determined that
[d]espite the amended language of article III, § 8-103(b) of the Family Law
Code, unless the separation agreement
is made part of the divorce decree, it
cannot be enforced by imprisonment
for contempt. There being no order to
pay the support, failure to ptry would
merely be a breach of contract and not
contemptuous disobedience of a court
order.

Mendelson at 497-98, 541 A.2d at 1337 (emphasis added). The court concluded that
the separation agreement was separate
from the decree of divorce despite the clear
language of th.e statute. There was therefore no basis from which to modify the
agreement. Id.
The Mendelson court then examined the
case law regarding non-merger clauses and
the attendant beliefs held by members of
the legal community resulting therefrom.
The court recognized that prior to 1983 it
was commonplace for attorneys to insert
non-merger clauses in separation agreements. Judge Bloom then cited two cases
which discussed the effect of non-merger
clauses, Id. at 1337 (citing Johnston v.
Johnston, 297 Md. 48, 465 A.2d 436 (1983);
Hamilos v. Hamilos, 297 Md. 99, 465 A.2d
445 (1983», and reasoned that:
[i]t was apparently believed that incorporation would make the agreement
part of the decree while non-merger
would preserve its contractual status.
Thus, in the event of a breach, it was
thought, the aggrieved party would
have the choice of enforcing the decree
or suing on the contract. Since such
language is still being inserted in sep~
ration agreements, we suspect that
Johnston has been ignored or misread.

Id. at 495,541 A.2d 1336 (emphasis added).
Mendelson relied primarily on the rationale of Johnston, which concerned the question of whether a separation agreement

incorporated but not merged into a
divorce decree was subject to collateral
attack. Johnston explained the difference
between the terms "incorporation" and
"merger." Whereas "incorporation" is the
mere identification and approval of the
validity of a separation agreement,
"merger" is a substitution of rights and
duties.Id. at 498, 541 A.2d 1337. The separation agreement is said to be superseded
by the decree when the agreement is
merged into the decree, and when the
agreement fails to indicate whether it
should be merged. As such, the agreement
would be enforceable through contempt
proceedings. Alternatively, if the separ~
tion agreement contains a non-merger
clause, the agreement is not superseded by
the decree and retains its "life" as a contract. But, because the agreement is a contract, it is not enforceable through
contempt proceedings. In applying
Johnston to the facts in Mendelson, the
court held that since the separation and
property settlement agreement was not
made part of the decree, the agreement
remained separate from the decree and
thus could not be enforced through contempt proceedings. Id. at 499, 541 A.2d
1338.
The court then turned its attention to
the question of whether the separation
agreement sub judice could be modified or
terminated by the court. By the terms of
the agreement, modification of spousal
support could take place only upon appellant's disability or retirement at age 60 or
thereafter. Since the separation agreement
was not merged, the agreement and not the
decree dictated the conditions under
which modification could be compelled.
Due to the rule foreclosing collateral
attack on agreements approved by a court
of competent jurisdiction, "[t]he circuit
court that issued that decree lost its continuing jurisdiction over it and thus any
power to modify it when the decree
became enrolled." Id. at 500, 541 A.2d
1338.
The court held that the separation agreement was unambiguous regarding the
terms under which spousal support could
be terminated. The conditions precedent
to the termination of spousal support were
remarriage of appellee, or the death of
either party. Since neither event occured,
the court held that the termination provisions had not been activated. Id.
The holding in Mendelson v. Mendelson
will affect many areas of domestic practice
in Maryland. Those who entered into sep~
ration agreements with non-merger clauses
might refuse to pay spousal and perhaps
even child support-the only recourse

being an action for breach of contract.
Cases concerning these and similar issues
will undoubtedly lead to a review of
Mendelson by the Court of Appeals of
Maryland.
In
subsequent
actions.
Mendelson may be attacked as inconsistent
with the intent of Johnston, Hamilos, the
Family Law Article and the Maryland
Constitution. Additionally, since the issue
of non-merger clauses was clearly not the
subject of appellant's action, the court's
analysis regarding non-merger clauses may
be considered dicta and given less weight.
Finally, there lies the question of the
potential liability of attorneys who
inserted non-merger clauses in separation
agreements, erroneously assuring clients
that, in the event of breach, an action
either for breach or contempt of court
could be maintained.

- Jules R. Brickel

Coy v. Iowa: PLACING SCREEN
BETWEEN DEFENDANT AND
WITNESS IN CRIMINAL TRIAL
VIOIA TES 1HE RIGHT TO FACETO-FACE CONFRONTATION
In Coy v. Iowa, __ U.S. ~ 108 S.
Ct. 2798 (1988), the Supreme Court of the
United States, in a plurality opinion, held
that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution gives a defendant the right to literal
face-to-face confrontation with the
witnesses against him. The plurality arrived at its decision by emphasizing that a
fair trial requires face-to-face confrontation between the accused and the accuser
in a criminal prosecution.
In August of 1985, the appellant, John
Avery Coy, was charged with sexually
assaulting two minor girls while they were
camping out in the backyard of the house
next door to his. The girls claimed that
Coy came into their tent, with a stocking
over his head, while they were sleeping.
Coy shined a flashlight in their eyes and
told them not to look at him. Consequently, the girls could not identify his face.
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